The Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS)

The Center for Education and Research in
Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS)

Reports and Papers Archive


Browse All Papers »       Submit A Paper »

Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control Model (GTRBAC) (Part I) - Specification and Modeling

CERIAS TR 2001-47
James B. D. Joshi, Elisa Bertino, Usman Latif, Arif Ghafoor
Download: PDF

A temporal RBAC (TRBAC) model has recently been proposed that addresses the temporal aspects of roles and trigger-based role enabling. However, it is limited to constraints on enabling of roles only. We propose a Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control model (GTRBAC) that is capable of expressing a wider range of temporal constraints. GTRBAC is capable of expressing periodic as well as duration constraints on roles, user-role assignments and role-permission assignments. In GTRBAC, temporal constraints on role enablings and role activations can be separately specified. A user-activated role can further be restricted to various activation constraints such as cardinality constraint or maximum active duration constraint within a specified interval. The GTRBAC model extends the syntactic structure of TRBAC model and its event and trigger expressions subsume those of TRBAC.

Added 2002-07-26

Reasoning about Belief in Cryptographic Protocols

Li Gong, Roger Needham, and Raphael Yahalom

Analysis methods for cryptographic protocols have often focused on information leakage rather than on seeing whether a protocol meets its goals.  Many protocols, however, fall far short of meeting their goals, sometimes for quite subtle reasons

Added 2002-07-26


Temporal Hierarchy and Inheritance Semantics for GTRBAC

CERIAS TR 2001-52
James B. D. Joshi, Elisa Bertino, Arif Ghafoor
Download: PDF

A Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control (GTRBAC) model that captures an exhaustive set of temporal constraint needs for access control has recently been proposed. GTRBAC

Added 2002-07-26

Privacy-Preserving Cooperative Scientific Computations

CERIAS TR 2001-50
Wenliang Du and Mikhail J. Atallah
Download: PDF
Added 2002-07-26

Optimizing TCP Forwarder Performance

Oliver Spatscheck, Jorgen S. Hansen, John H. Hartman, and Larry L. Peterson

A TCP forwarder is a network node that establishes and forwards data between a pair of TCP connections.  For example, a firewall that places a proxy between a TCP connection to an external host and a TCP connection to an internal host - for the purpose of implementing access control to a resource on the internal host - is an example of a TCP forwarder.

Added 2002-07-26

Cooperating Moblie Agents for Mapping Networks

Nelson Minar, Kwindla Hultman Kramer, and Pattie Maes

Contemporary computer networks are heterogeneous; even a single network consists of many kinds of processors and communications channels.  But few programming tools embrace, or even acknowledge, this complexity.  New methods and approaches are required if next-generation networks are to be configured, administered and utilized to their full potentials…

Added 2002-07-26

A Middleware Approach to Asynchronous and Backward-Compatible Detection and Prevention of ARP Cache Poisoning

CERIAS TR 1999-07
Mahesh V. Tripunitara and Partha Dutta
Download: PDF

This paper discusses the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and the problem of cache poisoning.  ARP cache poisoning is the malicious act, by a host in a LAN, of introducing a spurious IP address to MAC (Ethernet) address mapping in another host\‘s ARP cache…

Added 2002-07-26

Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing

Paul F. Syverson, David M. Goldschlag, and Michael G. Reed

Onion Routing provides anonymous connections that are strongly resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis.  Unmodified Internet applications can use these anonymous connections by means of proxies…

Added 2002-07-26

Protecting Software Code By Guards

CERIAS TR 2001-49
Hoi Chang and Mikhail J. Atallah
Download: PDF

Protection of software code against illegitimate modifications by its users is a pressing issue to many software developers. Many software-based mechanisms for protecting program code are too weak (e.g., they have single points of failure) or too expensive to apply (e.g., they in-  cur heavy runtime performance penalty to the protected programs). In this paper, we present and explore a methodology that we believe can protect program integrity in a more tamper-resilient and manner. Our approach is based on a distributed scheme, in which protection and tamper-resistance of program code is achieved, not by a single security module, but by a network of (smaller) security units that work together in the program. These security units, or guards, can be programmed to do certain tasks (checksumming the program code is one example) and a network of them can reinforce the protection of each other by creating mutual-protection. We have implemented a system for automating the process of installing guards into Win32 executables. 1 Experimental results show that memory space and run-time performance impacts incurred by guards can be kept very low (as explained later in the paper).

Added 2002-07-26

Flexible Policy-Directed Code Safety

David Evans, Andrew Twyman

This work introduces a new approach to code safety.  We present Naccio, a system architecture that allows a large class of safety policies to be expressed in a general and platform-independent way…

Added 2002-07-26

Execution Monitoring of Security-Critical Programs in Distributed Systems: A Specification-based Approach

Calvin Ko, Manfred Ruschitzka, Karl Levitt

This paper describes a specfication-based approach to detect exploitations of vulnerabilities in security-critical programs.  The approach utilizes security specifications that describe the intended behavior of programs and scans audit trails for operations that are in violation of the specifications…

Added 2002-07-26

Detecting Intrusions Using System Calls: Alternative Data Models

Christina Warrender, Stephanie Forrest, Barak Pearlmutter

Intrusion detection systems rely on a wide variety of observable data to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate activities.  In this paper we study one such observable - sequences of system calls into the kernel of an operating system…

Added 2002-07-26

Detecting Disruptive Routers: A Distributed Network Monitoring Approach

Kirk A. Bradley, Steven Cheung, Nick Puketza Biswanath Mukherjee, Ronald A. Olsson

An attractive target for a computer system attacker is the router.  An attacker in control of a router can disrupt communication by dropping or misrouting packets passing through the router.  We present a protocol called Watchers that detects and reacts to routers that drop or misroute packets…

Added 2002-07-26

Why Cryptography is Harder Than it Looks

Counterpane Systems
Added 2002-07-26