Abstract
Electronic commerce presents a number of seemingly contradictory requirements.
On the one hand, we must be able to account for funds and comply with laws
requiring disclosure of certain sorts of transaction information (e.g., taxable
transactions, transactions of more than $10,000). On the other hand, it is
often socially desirable to limit exposer of transaction information to protect
the privacy of the participants.
In this thesis, I address the following issues:
*I develop a new analysis technique for measuring the exposure of transaction
information
*I analyze various privacy and disclosure configurations to determine which
are technically feasible and which are logically impossible.
*I apply this analysis to the Information Networking Institute's proposed
"NetBill" billing server protocol.
*I consider the use of intermediary agents to protect anonymity and the
implications of various arrangements of intermediaries.
*I develop an encoding technique that can reveal the order of magnitude of
a transaction without revealing the exact value of the transaction itself.
