Abstract
Recommendations are rovided to promote accuracy, integrity, and security in computerized vote-tallying, and to improve confidence in the resuls produced. The recommendations respond to identified problems, and conern software, hardware, operational procedures, and institutional changes.
It is proposed that the concept of internal control, almost universally used to protect operations that produce priced goods or services, be adapted to vote-tallying, a non-priced service. For software, recommendations concern certrification, assurance of logical correctness, and protection against containation by hidden code. For hardware, recommendations concern accuracy of ballot reading, and design and certification of vote-tallying systems that do not use ballots. Improved pre-election testing and parial manuel recounting of ballots are recommended operational procedures.
Solme recent significant events concernign computerized cote-tallying are reported. These events unclude development of performance speciafications, publication of a series pf New York Times articles, and activities in texas leading to passage of a revised statute on electronic voting systems. Relative vulnerabilities of different tpes of voting-tallying systems, i.e. punch card, mark-sense, and dircet recording electronic , are discussed. Certain recent elections in which difficulties occurred are reviewed, and categories of failuere are highlighted.
Contents
1. Summary of Conclusions and recommendations
2. Background, and Recent Significant Events
3. types of Vote-Tallying Systems, their Vulnerabilities and Thier national distribution
4. Some Recent Difficulties in COmputerized Vote-Tallying
5. Applying IOnternal COntrol to COmputerized Elections
6. Detailed Conclusions and Recommendations
