Abstract
This dissertation demonstrates that inadequately protected wireless LANs are more vulnerable to rogue program attack than traditional LANs. Wireless LANs not only run the same risks as traditional LANs, but they also run additional risks associated with an open transmission medium. Intruders can scan radio waves and, given enough time and resources, intercept, analyze, decipher, and reinsert data into the transmission medium.
This dissertation describes the development and instantiation of an abstract model of the rogue code insertion process into a DOS-based wireless communications system using Radio Frequency (RF) atmospheric signal transmission. The model is general enough to be applied to widely used target environments such as UNIX, Macintosh and DOS operating systems. The methodology and three modules, the prober, activator, and trigger modules, to generate rogue code and insert it into a wireless LAN were developed to illustrate the efficacy of the model.
Also incorporated into the model are defense measures against remotely introduced rogue programs and a cost-benefit analysis that determined that such defenses for a specific environment were cost-justified.
