Abstract
Position-based routing protocols make routing de-
cisions based on the geographical position of the destination of a
packet. Such protocols scale well since they do not require nodes
to maintain explicit routes. Instead each node must know only its
own position, the position of its neighbors, and the position of the
destination. Thus, a critical component of position-based routing
protocols is the position service that allows nodes to obtain the
position of a destination node.
In this paper we analyze the security vulnerabilities of position-
based routing protocols and virtual home region (VHR)-based
distributed position service systems. We propose methods to
protect the position information from both external and internal
attackers. We then discuss and propose several mitigation mech-
anisms against position abuse by internal attackers that exploit
the position service to trace their targets. Finally, we propose a
position verification mechanism that allows the position service
to verify that the positions reported by nodes are correct.
