On the Survivability of Routing Protocols in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks

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Author

Baruch Awerbuch, Reza Curtmola, Herbert Rubens, David Holmer, and Cristina Nita-Rotaru

Tech report number

CERIAS TR 2005-121

Entry type

proceedings

Abstract

Survivable routing protocols are able to provide service in the presence of attacks and failures. The strongest attacks that protocols can experience are attacks where adversaries have full control of a number of authenticated nodes that behave arbitrarily to disrupt the network, also referred to as Byzantine attacks. This work examines the survivability of ad hoc wireless routing protocols in the presence of sev- eral Byzantine attacks: black holes, flood rushing, worm- holes and overlay network wormholes. Traditional secure routing protocols that assume authenticated nodes can al- ways be trusted, fail to defend against such attacks. Our protocol, ODSBR, is an on-demand wireless routing proto- col able to provide correct service in the presence of failures and Byzantine attacks. We demonstrate through simulations its effectiveness in mitigating such attacks. Our analysis of the impact of these attacks versus the adversary

Date

2005

Key alpha

On the Survivability of Routing Protocols in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks

Publisher

IEEE

School

Purdue University and Johns Hopkins University

Affiliation

Department of Computer Sciences

Publication Date

2005-01-01

Keywords

ad hoc networks, on-demand routing, security, Byzantine failures, wormhole attacks, flood rushing attacks, colluding attackers

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@Proceedings{ On the Survivability of Routing Protocols in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks,
	title = "On the Survivability of Routing Protocols in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks",
	author = "Baruch Awerbuch, Reza Curtmola, Herbert Rubens, David Holmer, and Cristina Nita-Rotaru ",
	year = "2005",
	publisher = "IEEE",
	school = "Purdue University and Johns Hopkins University",
	abstract = "Survivable routing protocols are able to provide service 
in the presence of attacks and failures. The strongest attacks 
that protocols can experience are attacks where adversaries 
have full control of a number of authenticated nodes that 
behave arbitrarily to disrupt the network, also referred to 
as Byzantine attacks. This work examines the survivability 
of ad hoc wireless routing protocols in the presence of sev- 
eral Byzantine attacks: black holes, flood rushing, worm- 
holes and overlay network wormholes. Traditional secure 
routing protocols that assume authenticated nodes can al- 
ways be trusted, fail to defend against such attacks. Our 
protocol, ODSBR, is an on-demand wireless routing proto- 
col able to provide correct service in the presence of failures 
and Byzantine attacks. We demonstrate through simulations 
its effectiveness in mitigating such attacks. Our analysis 
of the impact of these attacks versus the adversary",
	affiliation = "Department of Computer Sciences",
	keywords = "ad hoc networks, on-demand routing, security, Byzantine failures, wormhole attacks, flood rushing attacks, colluding attackers",
}