The user non-acceptance paradigm: INFOSEC's dirty little secret

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Author

SJ Greenwald, KG Olthoff, V Raskin, W Ruch

Entry type

inproceedings

Abstract

This panel will address users' perceptions and misperceptions of the risk/benefit and benefit/nuisance ratios associated with information security products, and will grope for a solution, based on the psychology of personality trait-factoring results, among other multidisciplinary approaches, to the problem of user non-acceptance of information security products. This problem has acquired a much more scientific guise when amalgamated with the psychology of personality and reinforced by reflections from the field on patterns of user behavior. A gross simplification of the main thrust of the panel is this thesis: if we start profiling the defenders rather than the offenders and do it on the basis of real science rather than very crude personality tests, then we will, at the very least, understand what is happening and possibly create a desirable profile for sysadmins, CIOs, and perhaps even CFOs. This swept-under-the-rug problem is information security's "dirty little secret." No other forum is designed to address this, and it may well become yet another major conceptual and paradigmatic shift in the field, of the type initiated in the NSPWs over the last decade. We know that the panel will generate an assured considerable interest among the participants.

Date

2004

Booktitle

Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on New security paradigms

Journal

New Security Paradigms Workshop

Key alpha

Raskin

Pages

35-43

Publisher

ACM

Publication Date

2004-01-01

BibTex-formatted data

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@Inproceedings{ Raskin,
	title = "The user non-acceptance paradigm: INFOSEC's dirty little secret",
	author = "SJ Greenwald, KG Olthoff, V Raskin, W Ruch",
	year = "2004",
	booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on New security paradigms",
	journal = "New Security Paradigms Workshop",
	pages = "35-43",
	publisher = "ACM",
	abstract = " This panel will address users' perceptions and misperceptions of the risk/benefit and benefit/nuisance ratios associated with information security products, and will grope for a solution, based on the psychology of personality trait-factoring results, among other multidisciplinary approaches, to the problem of user non-acceptance of information security products. This problem has acquired a much more scientific guise when amalgamated with the psychology of personality and reinforced by reflections from the field on patterns of user behavior. A gross simplification of the main thrust of the panel is this thesis: if we start profiling the defenders rather than the offenders and do it on the basis of real science rather than very crude personality tests, then we will, at the very least, understand what is happening and possibly create a desirable profile for sysadmins, CIOs, and perhaps even CFOs. This swept-under-the-rug problem is information security's "dirty little secret." No other forum is designed to address this, and it may well become yet another major conceptual and paradigmatic shift in the field, of the type initiated in the NSPWs over the last decade. We know that the panel will generate an assured considerable interest among the participants.
",
}