The Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS)

The Center for Education and Research in
Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS)

Measuring denial Of service

Author

Jelena Mirkovic, Peter Reiher, Sonia Fahmy, Roshan Thomas, Alefiya Hussain, Stephen Schwab, Calvin Ko

Entry type

conference

Abstract

Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks significantly degrade service quality experienced by legitimate users, by introducing large delays, excessive losses, and service interruptions. The main goal of DoS defenses is to neutralize this effect, and to quickly and fully restore quality of various services to levels acceptable by the users. To objectively evaluate a variety of proposed defenses we must be able to precisely measure damage created by an attack, i.e., the denial of service itself, in controlled testbed experiments. Current evaluation methodologies measure DoS damage superficially and partially by measuring a single traffic parameter, such as duration, loss or throughput, and showing divergence during the attack from the baseline case. These measures do not consider quality-of-service requirements of different applications and how they map into specific thresholds for various traffic parameters. They thus fail to measure the service quality experienced by the end users.We propose a series of DoS impact metrics that are derived from traffic traces gathered at the source and the destination networks. We segment a trace into higher-level user tasks, called transactions, that require a certain service quality to satisfy users' expectations. Each transaction is classified into one of several proposed application categories, and we define quality-of-service (QoS) requirements for each category via thresholds imposed on several traffic parameters. We measure DoS impact as a percentage of transactions that have not met their QoS requirements and aggregate this measure into several metrics that expose the level of service denial. We evaluate the proposed metrics on a series of experiments with a wide range of background traffic and our results show that our metrics capture the DoS impact more precisely then partial measures used in the past.

Date

2006

Booktitle

Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Quality of protection

Key alpha

Fahmy

Pages

53-58

Publisher

ACM

Affiliation

Purdue University

Publication Date

2006-00-00

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