Author
Mike Frantzen, Florian Kerschbaum, E. Eugene Schultz, Sonia Fahmy
Abstract
Vulnerabilities in vendor as well as freeware implementations of firewalls continue to emerge at a rapid pace. Each vulnerability superficially appears to be the result of something such as a coding flaw in one case, or a configuration weakness in another. Given the large number of firewall vulnerabilities that have surfaced in recent years, it is important to develop a comprehensive framework for understanding both what firewalls actually do when they receive incoming traffic and what can go wrong when they process this traffic. An intuitive starting point is to create a firewall dataflow model composed of discrete processing stages that reflect the processing characteristics of a given firewall. These stages do not necessarily all occur in all firewalls, nor do they always conform to the sequential order indicated in this paper. This paper also provides a more complete view of what happens inside a firewall, other than handling the filtering and possibly other rules that the administrator may have established. Complex interactions that influence the security that a firewall delivers frequently occur. Firewall administrators too often blindly believe that filtering rules solely decide the fate of any given packet. Distinguishing between the surface functionality (i.e., functionality related to packet filtering) and the deeper, dataflow-related functionality of firewalls provides a framework for understanding vulnerabilities that have surfaced in firewalls.
