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**EQUATING BIOMETRIC ENTROPY**

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# Biometrics in E-Authentic Equating Biometric Entr

Graduate

Biometric Con

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## PIN Compared to FAR

- Common assumption to equate entropy of a False Accept Rate (FAR) of a biometric system
- Biometric FAR: 0.01% = 1 in 10,000 chance of “guessing” or False Accept.
- PIN: Four digit PIN =  $(10 \times 10 \times 10 \times 10)$ , 1 in 10,000 chance of “guessing” the PIN.
- Are these the same?...not exactly

1. Brute force on PINs focused on a SINGLE PIN, a biometric system includes ALL samples.
  - Just as some secrets are harder to guess so too are biometric templates to be matched (Doddington, G., et al.).


Doddington, G., et al. *Sheep, Goats, Lambs and Wolves. An Analysis of Individual Differences in Performance.* in *International Conference on Spoken Language Processing.* 1998. Sydney, Australia.





## Flaws of PIN to FAR Assumption



2. FARs are NOT a static value for biometric systems
  - Variable thresholds in biometric matching between FAR and FRR to suit application



3. Entropy of secrets is directly tied to keyspaces
  - Assumption does not use keyspaces for determining entropy of biometrics.
  - Entropy of biometrics must be measured in order to be an equal comparison.
  - How many individual representations are biometric systems?

## Defining Keyspace of Fingerprint Image

- Ratha, N., et al. considers:
- Dimensions of the image (pixels)
- # of pixels a minutiae point consumes.
- Orientation angles of minutiae.
- # of minutiae required to be matched.
- 25 minutiae matched = 82 bits of information.
- Equal to 16-character nonsense password “m4yus78xpmks3bc9”.





Ratha, N., J. Connell, and R. Bolle, *Enhancing security and privacy in biometrics-based authentication systems*. IBM Systems Journal, 2001. 40(3).

## Proposed Methodology

- Build on the work done by Ratha, et al.
- Factor in probabilities of minutiae appearing at possible location using 3-D model.
- Incorporate the principles of Shannon's Information Theory and determination of entropy.

# Proposed Methodology



$$H(X) = \sum_x^n p(X) \log_2 \left( \frac{1}{p(X)} \right)$$

- Where:
  - $n$  = total # of possible locations for minutiae in the image.
  - $p(X)$  = the probability of minutiae occurring at each individual location.
  - $H(X)$  = Entropy in bits
- Example in regions:
- |      |
|------|
| 0.00 |
| 0.50 |

$$H(X) = (.50) \log_2 (2) + 2((.25) \log_2 (4)) = 0$$

Shannon, C.E., *Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems*. Bell Systems Technology, 1949. 28(October): p. 656-715.



Thank You

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