Tuesday, April 5, 2011
Panel Members:
Panel Summary by Nikhita Dulluri
In the first session of the CERIAS symposium, the theme of ‘Traitor Tracing and Data Provenance’ was discussed. The panelists spoke extensively about the various aspects relating to tracing the source of a given piece of data and the management of provenance data. The following offers a summary of the discussion in this panel.
With increasing amounts of data being shared among various organizations such as health care centers, academic institutions, financial organizations and government organizations, there is need to ensure the integrity of data so that the decisions based on this data are effective. Providing security to the data at hand does not suffice, it is also necessary to evaluate the source of the data for its trust-worthiness. Issues such as which protection method was used, how the data was protected, and whether it was vulnerable to any type of attack during transit might influence how the user uses the data. It is also necessary to keep track of different types of data, which may be spread across various domains. Identification of the context of the data usage i.e., why a user might want to access a particular piece of data or the intent of data access is also an important piece of information to be kept track of.
Finding the provenance of data is important to evaluate its trustworthiness; but this may in-turn cause a risk to privacy. In case of some systems, it may be important to hide the source of information in order to protect its privacy. Also, data or information transfer does not necessarily have to be on a file to file exchange basis- there is also a possibility that the data might have been paraphrased. Data which has a particular meaning in a given domain may mean something totally different in another domain. Data might also be given away by people unintentionally. The question now would be how to trace back to the original source of information. A possible solution suggested to this was to pay attention to the actual communication, move beyond the regions where we are comfortable and to put a human perspective on them, for that is how we communicate.
Scale is one of the major issues in designing systems for data provenance. This problem can be solved effectively for a single system, but the more one tries to scale it to a higher level, the less effective the system becomes. Also, deciding how much provenance is required is not an easy question to answer, as one cannot assume that one would know how much data the user would require. If the same amount of information as the previous transaction was provided, then one might end up providing excess (or insufficient) data than what is required.
In order to answer the question about how to set and regulate policies regarding the access of data, it is important to monitor rather than control the access to data. Policies when imposed at a higher level are good, if there is a reasonable expectation that people will act accordingly to the policy. It is important not to be completely open about what information will be tracked or monitored, as, if there is a determined attacker, this information would be useful for him to find a way around it.
The issue of data provenance and building systems to manage data provenance has importance in several different fields. In domains where conclusions are drawn based on a set of data and any alterations to the data would change the decisions made, data provenance is of critical importance. Domains such as the DoD, Health care institutions, finance, control systems and military are some examples.
To conclude, the problem of data provenance and building systems to manage data provenance is not specific to a domain or a type of data. If this problem can be solved effectively in one domain, then it can be extended and modified to provide the solution to other domains as well.
Tuesday, April 5, 2011
Keynote Summary by Mark Lohrum
Neal Ziring, the current technical director for the Information Assurance Directorate at the NSA, was given the honor of delivering the opening keynote for the 2011 CERIAS Symposium on April 5th at Purdue University. He discussed the trends in cyber threats from the 1980s to today and shifts of defenses in response to those threats. He noted that, as a society, we have built a great information network, but unless we can trust it and be defended against possible threats, we will not see the full potential of a vast network. Ziring’s focus, as an NSA representative, was primarily from a perspective of preserving national interests regarding information security.
Ziring discussed trends in threats to information security. In the 1980s, the scope of cyber threats was rather simple. Opposing nations wished to obtain information from servers belonging to the U.S., so the NSA wished to stop them. This was fairly straightforward. Since the 1980s, threats have become far more complex. The opponents may not be simply opposing countries; they may be organized criminals, rouge hackers, hacktivists, or more. Also in years past, much expertise was required to complete attacks. Now, not so much expertise is required, which results in more threat actors. In the past, attacks were not very focused. Someone would write a virus and see how many computers in a network in can effect, almost as if it were a competition. Now, attacks are far more focused on achieving a specific goal aimed at a specific target. Ziring cited a statistic that around 75% of viruses are targeted at less than 50 individual computers. Experts in information security must understand the specific goals of a threat actor so attacks can be predicted.
Ziring also discussed shifts in information security. The philosophy used to be to simply protect assets, but now the philosophy includes defending against known malicious code and hunting for not yet known threats. Another shift is that the NSA has become increasingly dependent upon commercial products. In the past, defenses were entirely built internally, but that just does not work against the ever-changing threats of today. Commercial software advances at a rate far faster than internal products can be developed. The NSA utilizes a multi-tiered security approach because all commercial products contain certain shortcomings. Where one commercial product fails to protect against a threat, another product should be able to counter that threat; this concept is used to layer security software to fully protect assets.
A current concern in information security is the demand for mobility. Cell phones have become part of everyday life, as we as a society carry them everywhere. As these are mobile networking computers, the potential shortcomings of security on these devices is a concern. If they are integrated with critical assets, a security hole is exposed. Similarly, cloud computing creates a concern. Integrity of information on servers which the NSA does not own must be ensured.
Ziring brought up a couple of general points to consider. First, information security requires situational awareness. Knowing the current status of critical information is necessary to defending it properly, and knowing the status of the security system consistently is required. Currently, many security systems are audited every several years, but it may be better to continuously check the status of the security system. And secondly, operations must be able to operate on a compromised network. The old philosophy was to recover from a network compromise, then resume activity. The new philosophy, because networks are so massive, is to be able to run operations while the network is in a compromised state.
Ziring concluded by discussing the need to create academic partnerships. Academic partnerships can help the NSA have access to the best researchers, newer standards, and newer technologies. Many of the current top secure systems would not have been possible without academic partnerships. It is impossible for the NSA to employ more people than the adversaries, but it is possible to outthink and out-innovate them.
I have not been blogging here for a while because of some health and workload issues. I hope to resume regular posts before too much longer.
Recently, I was interviewed about the current state of security . I think the interview came across fairly well, and captured a good cross-section of my current thinking on this topic. So, I'm posting a link to that interview here with some encouragement for you to go read it as a substitute for me writing a blog post:
Complexity Is Killing Us: A Security State of the Union With Eugene Spafford of CERIAS
Also, let me note that our annual CERIAS Symposium will be held April 5th & 6th here at Purdue. You can register and find more information via our web site.
But that isn't all!
Plus, all of the above are available via RSS feeds. We also have a Twitter feed: @cerias. Not all of our information goes out on the net, because some of it is restricted to our partner organizations, but eventually the majority of it makes it out to one of the above outlets.
So, although I haven't been blogging recently, there has still been a steady stream of activity from the 150+ people who make up the CERIAS "family."
followed by a reboot. You can also do this immediately, which will be good only until you reboot (note: sudo alone doesn't work, you need to do "sudo su -"):
net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1
net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1
net.ipv6.conf.lo.disable_ipv6 = 1
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/disable_ipv6
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/default/disable_ipv6
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/lo/disable_ipv6
I am posting the following at the request of someone associated with this effort at NITRD:
On May 19 the White House announced a new effort to enlist public involvement in defining new areas to "change the game" for cybersecurity. Three areas for research were proposed:
- Moving Target – Systems that move in multiple dimensions to disadvantage the attacker and increase resiliency.
- Tailored Trustworthy Spaces – Security tailored to the needs of a particular transaction rather than the other way around.
- Cyber Economic Incentives – A landscape of incentives that reward good cybersecurity and ensure crime doesn’t pay.
For the next few weeks (until June 18), the public is being invited to make comments. As readers of this blog tend to be well-informed about security issues and research needs, I'd like to encourage you to review the details of the research areas and add your thoughts to the discussion at http://cybersecurity.nitrd.gov As this effort will impact the Federal funding of research for FY2012 and beyond, adding your thoughts is not only beneficial to the government, but also beneficial to those of us in the research community to ensure that research topics are both useful and feasible.
As I've noted before I believe that referring to this as "game change" has the potential to create the wrong attitudes towards the problems. However, at least this isn't an attempt to solve everything in 60-90 days!