Primary Investigator:
Research Independant

Project Members
Andrew Markel

Insecure aircraft communications pose a significant threat to aviation security, as unauthorized actors can spoof and intercept transmissions between pilots and air traffic controllers (ATC). This research presents a secure authentication and integrity framework to improve trust in aviation communications. Secure aviation networks require the ability to authenticate aircraft to the secure ATC network and verify the integrity of all transmissions. The proposed solution uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to verify the integrity of communications. Certificates are attached to both aircraft registration and ATC stations, and the national database of valid certificates is managed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) which acts as the Certificate Authority (CA) to ensure consistency and trust. Each aircraft's radio is equipped with a certificate store containing valid ATC certificates, updated dynamically via ATC networks or manually through standard FAA database updates. Pilots authenticate to secure ATC frequency networks with their valid digital certificates, and pilots verify authenticity of the ATC station using the built-in certificate store, which mitigates the risk of spoofed transmissions. For aircraft-to-aircraft communication, pilots must trust that all aircraft authenticated and connected to a secure ATC frequency network are authenticated and trusted against the FAA database. This solution significantly improves aviation security by eliminating existing vulnerabilities that leave safety-critical communication open to spoofing and interception. Secure ATC networks that authenticate users and verify integrity of communications will protect these safety-critical communications.